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Abstract
We study auctions in which bidders may know the types of some rival bid-
ders but not others. This asymmetry in bidders’ knowledge about rivals’ types
has diﬀerent eﬀects on the two standard auction formats. In a second-price auc-
tion, it is weakly dominant to bid one’s valuation, so the knowledge of rivals’
types has no eﬀect, and the good is allocated eﬃciently. In a ﬁrst-price auction,
bidders reﬁne their bidding strategies based on their knowledge of rivals’ types,
which yields an ineﬃcient allocation. We show that the ineﬃcient allocation
in the ﬁrst-price auction translates into a poor revenue performance. Given
a standard regularity condition, the seller earns higher expected revenue from
the second-price auction than from the ﬁrst-price auction, whereas the bidders
are better oﬀ from the latter.
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Much of the existing auction literature assumes that bidders possess symmetric knowl-
edge regarding rival bidders’ types. For instance, the standard independent private
values (IPV) models assume that bidders are ignorant of the rival bidders’ types,
knowing only their distributions (e.g., Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson
(1981)). In a Bertrand model, bidders are assumed to know the realized types of
all opponents. The models with aﬃliation allow bidders to reﬁne their assessment
of the rival bidders’ types based on their signals, but treatment of a given bidder’s
knowledge about other bidders is often symmetric (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)).
In practice, bidders’ knowledge about their rivals is unlikely to be symmetric.
Bidders tend to know more about some rival bidders than others. For instance, in a
procurement auction competed by domestic ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms, domestic ﬁrms
are likely to know more about the technical capabilities of their domestic rivals than
foreign rivals. In auctions for government assets, such as mineral, timber harvesting,
and the spectrum rights, bidders often consist of incumbent ﬁrms with long history of
operation in the industry and relative newcomers in the area. It is then presumably
easier for a bidder to estimate the preferences and technological abilities of the old
ﬁrms than those of the new ones. A similar distinction may exist with respect to the
institutional buyers and noninstitutional buyers in art auctions as well as treasury
auctions.
We develop a model that accommodates such an asymmetry in the bidders’ knowl-
edge of their rivals’ types. Speciﬁcally, our model considers, in a symmetric IPV
setting, an arbitrary partition of bidders into “knowledge groups” such that bidders
know the valuations of their rivals within the same group, while they know only the
distribution of types for bidders outside their group. This model oﬀers a simple way
of describing the aforementioned asymmetry in a bidder’s knowledge of his rivals.
Aside from the dichotomous nature of a bidder’s information about his rivals, our
model is general. In particular, our model allows for an arbitrary partition structure,
which includes the two standard assumptions — full information and no information
about other bidders — as special cases.
We study how the asymmetric knowledge of a bidder’s rivals aﬀects the perfor-
mance of standard auctions. Toward this goal, we ﬁrst study existence of an equilib-
1rium in the standard auctions and characterize their properties. While the standard
weak dominance argument continues to work for the second-price auction (which is
equivalent to an ascending-bid auction in the IPV setting), the standard equilibrium
analysis for a ﬁrst-price auction does not follow, due to two features of our model: (1)
an equilibrium bidding strategy depends not just on one’s own valuation but also on
those of his group members; and (2) given the arbitrary partition structure, the auc-
tion becomes generally asymmetric since the group sizes may be diﬀerent. We adapt
Reny (1999) to establish existence of an equilibrium for a ﬁrst-price auction. Among
the properties found is that the highest valuation bidder in a group (henceforth called
“a group leader”) never loses to lower valuation bidders in the same group, making
the competition eﬀectively among the group leaders.
Second, we compare ﬁrst- and second-price (or equivalently, ascending-bid) auc-
tions in terms of allocative eﬃciency and expected revenue. We ﬁnd that the second-
price auction dominates the ﬁrst-price auction on both accounts. The eﬃciency dom-
inance of the second-price auction can be explained as follows. In a second-price
auction (or equivalently ascending bid auctions), it is a weakly dominant strategy
to bid one’s own valuation, regardless of the knowledge partition. Hence, absent a
reserve price, the second-price auction allocates the good eﬃciently. By contrast, an
equilibrium bidding strategy in a ﬁrst-price auction depends on a bidder’s knowledge
of his rivals’ valuations, since the latter aﬀects the optimal degree to which a given
bidder shades his bid. Since the realized types of rival bidders vary across groups, a
bidder of the same valuation but facing diﬀerent valuations of the within-group rivals
will bid diﬀerently, which results in ineﬃcient allocation of the good, even when the
valuations of the goods are symmetrically distributed.
Given the allocational ineﬃciency arising from ﬁrst-price auctions, the revenue
equivalence theorem would normally imply that that a second-price auction revenue-
dominates a ﬁrst-price auction. Our nonstandard informational assumption, however,
makes the revenue equivalence theorem less than immediate. In particular, in a ﬁrst-
price auction, a bidder’s winning probability may not depend solely on his bidding
strategy, but it may also depend on his valuation. For instance, as a bidder’s valuation
rises, this may lead his within-group rival bidders to readjust their bids. Hence, even
though the former bidder does not change his bid, his winning probability may change.
This latter possibility makes the standard envelope theorem — a key step in applying
2the revenue equivalence theorem — inapplicable in our setting. Our main analysis
consists in reestablishing this step to show that the aforementioned revenue ranking
holds in our model.
To our knowledge, the current paper is the ﬁrst to study how bidders’ knowledge
of their rivals’ types — in particular, its asymmetry — matters in auctions. A sim-
ilar feature is present in an auction with interdependent valuations since a bidder’s
signal contains information about other bidders’ valuations (see Milgrom and We-
ber (1982), Maskin (1992), Ausubel (1997), Es¨ o and Maskin (2000), Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000), Perry and Reny (2001), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000)). Despite
the similarity, there are a several important distinctions between this literature and
the current paper. First, the extent to which a bidder’s signal impacts on others’
valuations (hence, a bidder’s knowledge of his rivals) is symmetric in some of these
models (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Ausubel (1997), for instance). Second,
a bidder’s signal is single dimensional in these models, so his signal aﬀects both his
valuation and others’.1 In our model, a bidder observes multidimensional signals, one
for his valuation and others for other bidders’ valuations. This distinction matters
since a single dimensional signal often leads to an eﬃcient allocation in a symmetric
ﬁrst-price auction (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)), whereas an ineﬃcient allocation
arises in our model with multidimensional signals.2 Finally, these papers are purely
concerned about allocative eﬃciency, whereas we study both eﬃciency and revenue.
The current paper’s focus on the private-value setting separates the issue of “knowl-
edge of rivals’ types” as a distinct problem of its own, which is relevant in many
auction environments, and also yields an unambiguous revenue comparison of the
standard auctions. In this respect, the current paper complements that literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the
model. Section 3 then establishes existence of an equilibrium and characterize its
properties. Section 4 then compares the two auction forms. Section 5 concludes.
1In fact, in a typical model of interdependent valuations a signal aﬀect’s one own valuation more
than others (see the single crossing property assumed in Maskin (1992), Es¨ o and Maskin (2000),
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Perry and Reny (2001)). In our model, a bidder observes a signal on
his own valuation and a signal on others, separately.
2See Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) for the diﬃculty multidimensional signals pose for general
mechanism design.
32 Model
A seller has a single indivisible good to sell to n ≥ 3 risk neutral bidders. The
seller is assumed to put no value on the good. Bidders have independent private
values. Speciﬁcally, bidder i’s valuation vi is drawn from the interval [0,1], following
a common distribution function F(·) whose density function f(·) is bounded away
from zero. F is assumed to be common knowledge. Letting N denote the set of




We depart from standard IPV models (represented by Myerson (1981) and Riley
and Samuelson (1981)) by allowing some bidders to know about each other’s valu-
ation. To express this idea formally, we impose a partition structure G on the set
N, where G is the set of disjoint groups (or disjoint sets) with each group consist-
ing of bidders whose realized valuations are common knowledge among themselves.
Also, the partition structure is assumed to be common knowledge. Hereafter, G ∈ G
denotes a group. Then, letting vG := (vi)i∈G denote the vector of the valuations
of bidders in the group G, vG is assumed to be common knowledge among bidders
in G. Note that every realization of vG is commonly known to bidders in G while
only the distribution of vG is known to bidders in the other groups. A bidder is
referred to as a group leader if he has the highest valuation in the group. For later
use, we let vG/i := (vj)j∈G/i ∈ V G/i and v−G := (vj)j∈N/G ∈ V −G denote the proﬁle
of valuations for group G except for bidder i and the valuation proﬁle for all bidders





and the joint densities for the vector vG/i and v−G are similarly denoted by fG/i and
f−G, respectively.
Throughout, we consider two standard auctions, ﬁrst-price and second-price auc-
tion (which is equivalent to an ascending-bid auction), with no reserve price. The
assumption of no reserve price is made purely for simplicity, and all subsequent results
will continue to hold even when a binding reserve price is introduced. In our model,
bidders of the same group are informed of their types as common knowledge. Clearly,
3Throughout the paper, bold face letters are used to denote vectors.
4the seller could elicit such information for free through cross reporting and then use
it to extract the entire surplus from the bidders, while implementing any allocation.
In this sense, the standard auctions are not optimal at least from the revenue per-
spective. Nevertheless, we focus on the standard auctions, for several reasons: First,
these auctions are most frequently used, so our study will add to the positive analysis
on the subject matter — i.e., the knowledge of rivals’ types. Second, as will be seen
later, focusing on the two formats entails no loss if the goal of mechanism design is
allocative eﬃciency.4 Third, our model is intended to serve as a metaphor for a gen-
eral scenario in which bidders have asymmetric information about their rivals’ types.
Our positive analysis can yield insights of broad applicability beyond the particular
model studied (while the cross-reporting mechanism appears to require the particular
partition model).
As is well known, in a second-price auction, all bidders bid simultaneously, and
the highest bidder wins the good and pays for the highest losing bid. Ties are broken
arbitrarily. Given our IPV assumption, the ascending-bid auction (more precisely,
the Japanese button auction) is strategically equivalent to the second-price auction
(albeit diﬀerent in the extensive form), and either format is simply referred to as a
second-price auction throughout the paper.
In a ﬁrst-price auction, all bidders bid simultaneously, and the highest bidder wins
and pays his bid. Unlike a second-price auction, a tie-breaking rule is important in
guaranteeing existence of an equilibrium in this format. For instance, in a standard
Bertrand game played by two ﬁrms with heterogeneous costs, a Nash equilibrium
exists only when the ties are broken in favor of the lower-cost ﬁrm. For the same
reason, we assume that (1) a tie is broken in favor of a bidder with a higher valua-
tion if there are multiple highest bidders; and that (2) if there are multiple highest
bidders with the same valuation, then the object is assigned randomly with equal
probability among those bidders. While this tie-breaking rule is endogenous, it can
be implemented by performing an auxiliary second-price auction with bidders who
submitted the highest bid in ﬁrst-price auction.5 In both games, we look for a Nash
4As the literature on interdependent valuations points out, the main objective of many govern-
ment auctions has been achieving allocative eﬃcient, and not revenue maximization.
5See Maskin and Riley (2000) for a similar assumption about tie breaking. Further, our tie-
breaking rule can be justiﬁed as producing a limiting equilibrium of a game in which bidders must
bid in a discrete space and a random tie-breaking rule is used.
5equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies.
Our model includes as special cases two extreme partition structures. In the one
case, every set in the partition is a singleton, so every bidder knows only his valuation.
This is the standard assumption made in the auction literature. The other case has
one grand set in the partition, which means that bidders know all other bidders’
types. The resulting game is precisely the Bertrand game. As is well known, revenue
equivalence holds for these two partition structures.
Proposition 0 If |G| = 1 for all G ∈ G or there is a G ∈ G such that |G| = n, then
ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions are revenue equivalent.6
Proof. For the former case, the result follows from Myerson (1981) or Riley and
Samuelson (1981). For the latter, it is a unique equilibrium for a group leader to
bid the second highest valuation, which results in the same outcome as the weakly
dominant equilibrium of the second-price auction does.
To focus on more interesting cases, we impose the following assumption in the
sequel.
Assumption 1 There is a group G such that 1 < |G| < n.
Apart from this assumption, we do not impose any restriction on the partition
structure. Naturally, diﬀerent groups may contain diﬀerent numbers of bidders, so
the partition may be asymmetric. For instance, if there are four bidders with N =
{1,2,3,4}, our model encompasses three diﬀerent possibilities: two groups of two
(e.g., {{1,2},{3,4}}), one group of three and one group of one (e.g., {{1,2,3},{4}}),
two groups of one and one group of two (e.g., {{1},{2},{3,4}}), while Proposition 0
covers the two special cases: {{1,2,3,4}} and {{1},{2},{3},{4}}.
6Throughout, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
63 Equilibrium Characterizations and Eﬃciency Com-
parison
3.1 Second-Price Auction
The well-known argument from Vickrey (1961) works in this game, regardless of the
partition structure: Each bidder has a weakly dominant strategy of bidding his valua-
tion. The optimality of this strategy does not depend on rivals’ bids, so the knowledge
of their types, and hence the partition structure, does not aﬀect the equilibrium be-
havior. It follows that the good is allocated eﬃciently in every partition structure.
This result will be used for subsequent comparison with the ﬁrst-price auction.
The equilibrium for ﬁrst-price auction is not as immediate. Hence, the remainder
of this section is devoted to that case.
3.2 First-Price Auction
We ﬁrst establish several necessary conditions for an equilibrium, given any arbitrary
knowledge partition. These conditions will constitute partial characterizations of
equilibrium, which will be used for establishing existence of the equilibrium and for
comparison with the second-price auction.
To this end, ﬁx an equilibrium (whose existence will be shown later). Fix any
bidder i ∈ G and let m(i) ∈ argmaxj∈G/i vj be the highest valuation bidder, exclud-
ing bidder i, in the same group, and let vm(i) be his valuation. Let bi(vG) and bi
respectively denote an arbitrary selection of bidder i’s equilibrium bids and their in-
ﬁmum, given the valuation proﬁle, vG, of group G. Since we restrict the equilibrium
strategies to be undominated, we must have bi(vG) ≤ vi. The following lemma shows
that bi(vG) ≥ vm(i) whenever vi > vm(i).
Lemma 1 If vi > vm(i), then, in any equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction, bi ≥ vm(i)
and i beats all bidders in G.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma implies that allocation is eﬃcient within each group in any equi-
librium. It also implies that competition is eﬀectively among the group leaders, so
7the attention can be restricted to group leaders when we search for an equilibrium.
The next lemma shows that the equilibrium distributions of their bids have no mass
points.7 It refers to yG(b), which denotes the probability of outbidding all bidders
outside a group G with a bid of b in an arbitrary equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium of a ﬁrst-price auction, yG(b) is continuous in b for
every G ∈ G.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We next show that any equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction is essentially pure.
Lemma 3 For each G ∈ G, the equilibrium bid, bi(vG), is unique for almost every
vG such that vi > vm(i).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are now in a position to address the existence issue. Two features of the
model make the standard existence result inapplicable in our setting. First, each
bidder observes the entire proﬁle of valuations of his group members, so this creates
a multi-dimensional signal problem. Second, since we assume an arbitrary knowledge
partition, the environment is generally asymmetric. Our proof builds on the existence
result of Reny (1999). We will sketch the proof, whose detailed version is contained
in the appendix.
Proposition 1 There exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which each bidder, say i,
employs a bidding strategy, bi(vG) that is nondecreasing and takes a value in [vm(i),vi]
when vi ≥ vm(i), or else bi(vG) = vi.
7While this result would be standard in the auction literature, our informational structure makes
it nontrivial and warrants a separate proof. The standard proof is based on the argument along
the following line: if a bidder puts mass on a bid b, then there exists an interval (b − ,b) to which
everyone else assigns probability 0, which then proves a proﬁtable deviation from b (see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991) pp.223-225). This argument does not work in our model since, by Lemma 1, a
group leader is constrained by the second-highest valuation in his group, so bids will be placed on
every interval with some probability. Our proof basically amounts to showing that if a positive mass
is put on b by a group leader, the opponent group leaders will submit bids between (b − ,b) with
such a small probability that it pays the former leader to move the mass point.
8Proof Sketch: [Formal proof is collected in the Appendix.] We consider a hypo-
thetical ﬁrst-price auction game in which there is one player representing each group.
Speciﬁcally, for each group I ∈ G in the original game, we assign a single player with
a signal, vI = (vi)i∈I ∈ [0,1]|I|. That player realizes the highest valuation of vI, upon




I denotes the rth order statistics of vector vI, and v2
I := 0 if |I| = 1.
We then closely follow the arguments of Reny (1999) to prove that the hypothetical
game has a pure-strategy equilibrium, β
∗, in which each (hypothetical) player is




Given the equilibrium, β
∗, of the hypothetical game, we can construct the equi-
librium of the original game as follows: Each bidder i ∈ I bids min{vi,β∗
I(vI)} for
a value realization vI of the group I. To see that this forms an equilibrium of the
original game, suppose ﬁrst that i is not a group leader. Then, given our endogenous
tie-breaking rule and β∗
I(vI) ≥ vi, bidder i has no incentive to deviate. If i is a group
leader, his equilibrium bid is β∗
I(vI) ≤ vi. Given the behavior of other bidders in his
group, bidder i cannot beneﬁt from bidding below v2
I. Given this constraint, bidding
β∗
I(vI) is optimal since β∗
I is an equilibrium strategy in the hypothetical game.
Given the private value speciﬁcation, a group leader’s equilibrium bid is likely to
depend only on his valuation and the second highest valuation in the group. In fact,
it is likely that there exists an unconstrained bidding strategy, BI(v), for group I
such that a leader of group I bids max{BI(v1
I),v2
I}, given the ﬁrst and second-highest
valuations, v1
I and v2
I, respectively. The following example illustrates this pattern.
Example 1 Suppose that there are four bidders in two equal-sized groups: G =
{{1,2},{3,4}}. Suppose also that each bidder draws his valuation uniformly from
[0,1]. It is then a (symmetric) equilibrium for each bidder to bid min{vi,max{2
3vi,vm(i)}}
when his valuation is vi and that of the other bidder in the group is vm(i). In this equi-
librium, a group leader with valuation vi adopts an unconstrained bid B(vi) = 2
3vi,
9unless it is less than the valuation of the other bidder in his group.8 That is, a leader
behaves much as in a standard ﬁrst-price auction (i.e., singleton partitions), except
that he behaves like a Bertrand player against his within-group rivals. Note also that
the unconstrained bid, B(vi) = 2
3vi, adopted by the group leader is the same as the
equilibrium bid that would be employed in a standard ﬁrst-price auction game (i.e.,
singleton knowledge partitions) with only three players. Essentially, the group leader
acts as if he faces no competition from the lower valuation bidder in his group as long
as 2
3vi ≥ vm(i). Clearly this will reduce the competition, all else equal. On the other
hand, whenever the 2
3vi < vm(i), the second highest valuation acts as a constraint, thus
raising the intensity of competition. How these two conﬂicting eﬀects will aﬀect the
revenue will be the subject of the next section.
3.3 Eﬃciency Comparison of Auctions
We are now in a position to study the allocational features of the ﬁrst-price auction.
Given the properties established above, it is not diﬃcult to see the possibility that the
ﬁrst-price auction may entail an ineﬃcient allocation. As is usually the case with this
format, a bidder shades his bid to optimally balance the incremental proﬁt and the
incremental reduction in the winning probability, associated with raising his bid. As is
clear from Lemma 1, the extent of shading is bounded by the second highest valuation
of his group. Hence, a group leader facing within-group rivals with higher valuations
will bid more aggressively than a group leader facing ones with lower valuations, even
though the former leader has a lower valuation than the latter leader.
This point can be illustrated via Example 1. In that example, bidders’ valuations
8That this is an equilibrium can be seen as follows. Since two groups are symmetric,
yG(b) = Prob{vG| max{B(vi),vm(i)} ≤ b, where i = argmax
j∈G
vj}
= Prob{vG| vi ≤ B−1(b) and vm(i) ≤ b, where i = argmax
j∈G
vj}
= 2F(3b/2)F(b) − F2(b) = 2bmax{1,3b/2} − b2.
A group leader with valuation vi maximizes yG(b)(vi − b) subject to the constraint b ≥ vm(i). It
can be easily veriﬁed that with yG(b) given above, yG(b)(vi −b) is increasing with b for b < 2
3vi and
decreasing for b > 2
3vi, which implies max{2
3vi,vm(i)} is indeed an equilibrium.
10satisfy







with positive probability. Given such realizations of valuations, bidders 1 and 3 are
group leaders who bid 2
3v1 and v4, respectively, in equilibrium. Since 2
3v1 < v4, bidder
3 then wins the object, which is ineﬃcient since v1 > v3. As explained in the above
paragraph, a low v2 allows bidder 1 to shade more than bidder 3, who is constrained
by a high v4, so the latter outbids the former. This observation is generalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, a ﬁrst-price auction allocates the good ineﬃ-
ciently with positive probability in any equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that yG(b) denotes the probability of outbidding all bidders outside a
group G with a bid of b in a ﬁrst-price auction. By Lemma 2, yG(b) is continuous.
Hence, there must be an interval [b−,b+] where, for some G, yG(b) is strictly increasing.
Otherwise, the continuity of yG(b) implies every bidder is putting the entire mass on
a single bid, which clearly cannot hold in an equilibrium.
Eﬃciency requires that for almost every vG with b− ≤ vm(i) < vi ≤ b+,
yG(bi(vG)) = F
n−|G|(vi). (1)
Since i must receive positive expected payoﬀ, we know from Lemma 1 that vm(i) ≤
bi(vG) < vi. Fix any vG satisfying (1) and consider an arbitrary v0
G = (v0
j)j∈G
satisfying b− ≤ bi(vG) < v0
m(i) < v0
i = vi ≤ b+. Clearly, there exists a positive







again by Lemma 1. Since yG(b) strictly increases in b for b ∈ [b−,b+],
yG(bi(v
0
G)) > yG(bi(vG)) = F
n−|G|(vi),
which violates (1).
This result immediately implies that the second-price auction dominates the ﬁrst-
price auction in terms of allocative eﬃciency.
114 Revenue Comparison
In this section, we study the revenue implications of employing alternative auction
formats. The revenue equivalence theorem would normally imply that the allocational
ineﬃciency of the ﬁrst-price auction translates into a poor revenue performance, rel-
ative to a second-price auction. As will be seen, our non-standard informational
problem renders the standard revenue equivalence argument inapplicable. As men-
tioned in the introduction, a key step in applying the revenue equivalence theorem —
the envelope theorem which enables one to express a bidder’s payoﬀ as an integral of
his winning probability — does not follow from the standard argument. We proceed
in two steps, ﬁrst establishing the revenue equivalence theorem, assuming the enve-
lope theorem, and then we prove that the envelope theorem works for the ﬁrst-price
auction.
4.1 Revenue Equivalence Theorem
Fix an arbitrary auction form and an associated equilibrium. Suppose that, in that
equilibrium, bidder i wins the good with probability xi(v) and makes an expected
payment ti(v), when bidders have valuations, v. Taking expectation over v−G, we










Bidder i’s expected utility is then expressed as:
πi(vG) := vixi(vG) − ti(vG) (2)
The following lemma shows that the expected revenue is completely determined
by the allocation of the good, given the envelope theorem result.



















Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 provides an easy method for comparing revenues across diﬀerent auction
formats. As mentioned, condition (3) is not immediate for a ﬁrst-price auction in our
model, and will be the focus of the next subsection. The next lemma explores the
revenue implications of the allocative ineﬃciency. It refers to the following regularity
condition, which is standard in the mechanism design literature:
Assumption 2 J(vi) is strictly increasing on the interval [0,1].
Speciﬁcally, the lemma shows that, given this assumption, an allocationally ef-
ﬁcient auction dominates an ineﬃcient one in terms of revenue but that, given a
slightly stronger assumption, the opposite ranking holds in terms of the expected
surplus accruing to the bidders.
Lemma 5 Suppose that two auction formats, named E and I, satisfy (3). If auction
E allocates the good eﬃciently almost surely and auction I ineﬃciently with positive
probability, then, given Assumption 2, auction E yields strictly higher expected revenue
than auction I. Furthermore, if (1 − F(·))/f(·) is strictly decreasing on the interval
[0,1],9 then bidders receive higher expected surplus in auction I than in auction E.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Proposition 2, Lemma 5 will yield an unambiguous revenue comparison
between the ﬁrst- and second-price auctions if condition (3) holds for both auction
formats. We turn to this latter issue.
9Note that this assumption is stronger than Assumption 2.
134.2 The Envelope Theorem
To see if condition (3) holds in the two auction formats, ﬁx an auction format (to
be one of the two) and an associated equilibrium. Let zi(b;vi,vG/i) and τi(b;vi,vG/i)
respectively denote bidder i’s winning probability and expected payment in that equi-
librium, if he observes vG and bids b (which may not be his equilibrium bid) and all
others play their equilibrium strategies. The resulting payoﬀ for bidder i can be
expressed as:
πi(b;vi,vG/i) := zi(b;vi,vG/i)vi − τi(b;vi,vG/i). (5)
In equilibrium, bidder i plays his equilibrium strategy bi(vG), so he must win with
probability, xi(vG) = zi(bi(vG);vG), and pay ti(vG) = τi(bi(vG);vG), and hence re-
ceives the payoﬀ of πi(vG) = xi(vG)vi−ti(vG), given proﬁle vG of group G valuations.
The standard envelope theorem has two components: (a) πi(b;vi,vG/i) is abso-
lutely continuous in v, which enables one to express it as an integral of its partial
derivative with respect to v (see Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Segal (2000), for in-
stance); and (b) that partial derivative, whenever exists, equals bidder i’s probability
of winning.
These two properties are readily seen to hold in the second-price auction. In this
format, the weak dominance property of the equilibrium strategy means that bidder
i’s winning probability, zi(b;vi,vG/i), is independent of his own valuation, vi, which
implies that both (a) and (b) holds. Hence, condition (3) holds in a second-price
auction.
Things are diﬀerent, however, for the ﬁrst-price auction. In its equilibrium, bidder
i’s winning probability, zi(b;vi,vG/i), may depend on his own valuation vi: Fixing
his bid, as vi rises, for instance, other bidders in the same group may adjust their
strategies, which may aﬀect his winning probability. The dependence of zi on vi
makes the standard argument problematic, for neither (a) nor (b) may hold. To see
this, reconsider Example 1, in which bidder j 6= i bids min{vj,max{2
3vj,vi}}. Figure
1 shows how a bidder j’s equilibrium bidding strategy varies with i’s valuation vi,
when j’s valuation remains ﬁxed at vj.
[Insert Figure 1 around here.]
14Given j’s equilibrium bidding strategy,
zi(b;vi,vG/i) =
(
yG(b) = 2bmax{1,3b/2} − b2 if vi < b
0 if vi ≥ b
. (6)
Clearly, i’s probability of winning decreases in vi discontinuously, ﬁxing his bid at b.
Hence, property (a) does not hold. Property (b) also becomes problematic. To see
this, suppose that πi(vG) is diﬀerentiable with respect to vi (which is unclear given






   
b=bi(vG)
[vi − bi(vG)]. (7)
If the second term does not vanish, property (b) will not hold.
Despite these possible problems, we show below that condition (3) holds in any
equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction. The key observations are that the failures
of properties (a) and (b) are out-of-equilibrium phenomena and that condition (3)
requires the two properties to hold only on the equilibrium path. For instance, in
the above example, it is precisely when vi = bi(vG) that zi falls discontinuously as
vi increases, implying that the second term in (7) indeed vanishes. We present this
result below.




xi(s,vG/i)ds ∀vi ∈ [0,1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.3 Revenue Comparison
We are now ready to present our revenue comparison of the two standard auctions.
By Lemma 6, condition (3) holds for the two auction formats. We also noted that the
ﬁrst-price auction produces an ineﬃcient allocation in any equilibrium (see Proposi-
tion 2), while the allocation is eﬃcient in second price auction. Hence, the revenue
dominance of the second-price auction follows from Lemma 5.
15Proposition 3 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, a ﬁrst-price auction generates strictly
lower expected revenue than a second-price auction, absent a reserve price. If we
further assume that (1−F(·))/f(·) is strictly decreasing on the interval [0,1], bidders
receive greater surplus in a ﬁrst-price auction than in a second-price auction.
Several remarks are in order. First, the proposition relies only on necessary con-
ditions of an equilibrium. Hence, the results stated apply to any (undominated)
equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction and not just to the one described in Proposition
1.
Second, recall that the two auction formats are revenue equivalent if bidders are
completely ignorant of their rivals’ types (see Proposition 0). Therefore, Proposition
3 implies that the seller is worse oﬀ in a ﬁrst-price auction from bidders’ acquiring
asymmetric knowledge of their rivals’ types.10 While the reduced revenue can be
attributed to the ineﬃcient allocation caused by their (asymmetric) knowledge, it is
important to note that the revenue loss does not coincide with the eﬃciency loss.
Proposition 3 informs us that, given a mild regularity condition, the revenue loss is
greater than the eﬃciency loss, which means that the bidders are collectively better
oﬀ from acquiring (asymmetric) knowledge of their rivals’ types — hence the title of
this paper.
Third, our revenue result can be also interpreted in terms of the two eﬀects dis-
cussed in Example 1. As was seen there, the knowledge of rivals’ types reduces the
eﬀective number of competitors a group leader faces. This eﬀect blunts the compe-
tition. On the other hand, the knowledge of the rivals’ types may raise the leader’s
bid in a way not possible in the standard case. Our revenue result suggests that the
former eﬀect dominates the latter eﬀect, so the net eﬀect is to reduce the competi-
tion. The same intuition suggests that if the partition structure is changed to increase
the former eﬀect (more members within a group), the overall competition would fall.
While this point cannot be generally shown, it is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2 Consider a ﬁrst-price auction with 6 bidders, each valuing the good at v
uniformly drawn from [0,1]. Consider two partition structures: two groups of three
10As Proposition 0 suggests, if all bidders’ types become common knowledge to all of them, then
revenue equivalence is restored. Hence, the eﬀect of acquiring information about rivals’ types is
ultimately nonmonotonic.
16bidders and three groups of two bidders. In the former partition, a bidder i’s equilib-
rium bidding function is min{vi,max{3
4vi,vm(i)}}, and it is min{vi,max{4
5vi,vm(i)}}
in the latter partition. Comparison of the unconstrained bidding functions, 3
4vi and
4
5vi, reveals that the competition-reduction eﬀect is severer when the group size is big-
ger for a given total number of bidders. This is intuitive since a group leader can
aﬀord to bid lower when he knows that there are more lower valuation bidders. Mean-
while, the bigger the group size is, the more likely is vm(i) to take a large value, thus
more likely to constrain the leader’s bid. Consistent with our analytical result, the
former eﬀect turns out to dominate the latter eﬀect: The expected revenue generated
is 0.6998 in the former partition and 0.7067 in the latter partition.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the bidders’ asymmetric knowledge about their rivals’ types
adversely aﬀects the ﬁrst-price auction, both in terms of allocative eﬃciency and
expected revenue, thus favoring the second-price auction relative to the ﬁrst-price
auction. We conclude by commenting on some extensions.
• Correlated Private Values: If bidders’ valuations are correlated but private, then
the revenue/eﬃciency ranking found in this paper still holds. In particular, the
weak dominance property of the second-price auction continues to hold, and
produces an eﬃcient allocation. Likewise, Proposition 2 continues to hold, so
ineﬃcient allocation arises in any equilibrium of a ﬁrst-price auction. As in the
current model, this ineﬃciency implies a poor revenue performance of the ﬁrst-
price auction, relative to the second-price auction. Furthermore, the well-known
linkage eﬀect reinforces the revenue dominance of the second price auction (see
Milgrom (1989)).
Our model is not immediately generalizable to the aﬃliated/interdendent
valuations case. The within-group knowledge of valuations will render allo-
cations ineﬃcient even in the second price auction. While the linkage eﬀect
will continue to favor the second-price auction, the precise comparison remains
unclear.
17• Costs of Learning Rivals’ Types: In practice, the knowledge of rivals’ types
may not be freely available but may rather require a costly learning process.
Costly learning of rivals’ types can reinforce the results of the current paper.
To ﬁx the idea, suppose that bidders can learn the types of his within-group
rivals at some small cost c > 0, while it is prohibitively costly to learn the
types of rivals outside his group. The presence of such learning cost will not
change the revenue comparison. In a second-price auction, the weak dominance
property implies that the bidders have no incentive to learn their rivals’ types.
By contrast, bidders will have incentives to learn their (within-group) rivals’
types in the ﬁrst-price auction. Learning rivals’ types enables a bidder to reﬁne
his assessments of his rivals’ strategies and tailor his own strategy based on
the reﬁned assessments. While this feature presents some modelling challenges
since diﬀerent types of bidders will have diﬀering incentives to learn their rivals’
types,11 some types of bidders will likely learn in equilibrium if c is suﬃciently
small. Since the learning cost adds to the social costs, the inferiority of a ﬁrst-
price auction will then persist and may even be severer.
• Within-Group Collusion: It is natural to suspect that the mutual knowledge of
valuations within a group may facilitate collusion among group members. This
will simply mean in our framework that all bidders except for group leaders drop
out of competition in each auction format. Then, competition will be simply
among group leaders without any within-group challenge. If there are K groups,
then it becomes a K-bidder auction in which group G ∈ G leader draws his
valuation from cdf F |G|. Clearly, if the group size is the same across the groups,
then eﬃcient allocation will be attained under both formats, and their revenue
equivalence will be restored.12 If the group sizes are heterogeneous, then the
ensuing auctions become standard asymmetric auctions. Incidentally, Marshall,
11For instance, a bidder with zero valuation will never learn. Our conjecture is that, for a suﬃ-
ciently small c there exists a threshold level of valuation for each bidder such that in equilibrium
that bidder learns if and only if his valuation exceeds that threshold value. Our ineﬃciency result
will continue to hold, given this outcome. Further, some learning costs will be expended. This
conceptual problem can be avoided, at some loss of realism, if one models the learning of rivals’
types as taking place before or at the same time of learning one’s own valuation.
12It is easy to see that the revenues will be lower with this type of collusion than without the
collusion.
18Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist (1994) considered asymmetric auctions in
which bidders’ valuations are drawn from a cdf of the form, F mi, for some
integer mi for each i ∈ N. Interestingly, their numerical analysis reveals that
a ﬁrst-price auction revenue dominates the second-price auction, when F takes
a uniform distribution. Whether this reversal of ranking holds more generally
(in the case of collusion) remains an issue.
• Imperfect Knowledge of Rivals’ Types: An avenue of extension is to relax the
dichotomous nature of a bidder’s knowledge. In the current model, each bidder
either knows his rival’s type completely (if his rival is inside his group) or not
at all (if his rival is outside his group). If a bidder were to obtain imperfect
signals about his rivals’ types, this would not aﬀect the comparison in terms
of allocative eﬃciency. These signals will aﬀect the bidders’ strategies in a
way that will disrupt eﬃcient allocation in the ﬁrst-price auction, while the
weak dominance argument will continue to imply that these signals will have
no impact on the bidding behavior in the second-price auction. The revenue
comparison becomes nontrivial, however, since the envelope argument does not
hold.13 Generalization along this line thus awaits further research.
13The ﬁrst-price auction creates a linkage eﬀect somewhat reminiscent of the one arising in the
aﬃliated value setting. The presence of this eﬀect makes the overall ranking ambiguous.
19Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Bidder i must receive strictly positive (expected) payoﬀ in
equilibrium (since he can bid slightly higher than vm(i), which will win with positive
probability). If bi < vm(i), then bidder m(i) must also earn strictly positive payoﬀ in
equilibrium. For both bidders to earn positive payoﬀs, their inﬁmum must coincide
and each must put mass point there. But then it pays either one of them to raise the
mass point slightly above, which will increase the probability of winning discontinu-
ously while lowering his payoﬀ conditional on winning only slightly. Hence, we have
a contradiction, so we must have bi ≥ vm(i). The last statement follows directly from
the ﬁrst statement and our tie-breaking rule.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose to the contrary that yG(b) jumps up at b for some
group G. This can only occur if the leader of another group, say ˜ G 6= G, puts mass on
b. We must have only one such group since, otherwise, one of leaders of those groups
would want to bid slightly above b to increase the winning probability discontinuously.
Therefore, y ˜ G is continuous at b. Since the leader of ˜ G bids b for a positive measure
of type proﬁles of ˜ G bidders, there must exist such a proﬁle, v ˜ G, with v2
˜ G < b ≤ v1
˜ G,
where v1
˜ G and v2
˜ G are the ﬁrst and second order statistics of v ˜ G. The leader of ˜ G can
ensure himself a positive surplus given v ˜ G, so we must also have y ˜ G(b) > 0.
In equilibrium, the group G leader should have no incentive to deviate by bidding
below b given v ˜ G, which requires that, for  > 0,
[v
1
˜ G − (b − )]y ˜ G(b − ) ≤ [v
1




˜ G − b]
y ˜ G(b) − y ˜ G(b − )

≥ y ˜ G(b − ). (A.1)
For suﬃciently  > 0, y ˜ G(b − ) must be strictly positive since y ˜ G(·) is continuous at
b and y ˜ G(b) > 0. Hence, to prove that such deviation is proﬁtable, it suﬃces to show
limsup
↓0
y ˜ G(b) − y ˜ G(b − )

≤ 0. (A.2)
We prove this in the remainder.
20Consider again any group G 6= ˜ G. If G consists of a single bidder, then for small
enough , he would assign probability 0 to the interval [b − ,b). Hence, no single-
bidder group can contribute to y ˜ G(b) − y ˜ G(b − ), for a suﬃciently small , and we
are done if all groups other than ˜ G have single bidders. Assume therefore that there
exists a group G 6= ˜ G, which contains more than one bidder. We show below that
even such a group chooses almost zero probability in the interval [b−,b) for a small
 > 0.
To prove this, we ﬁnd an upper bound for y ˜ G(b)−y ˜ G(b−) for a small , which is
accomplished by identifying a set of vG for which a leader of G should not make a bid
between b and b−. To begin, note that since yG jumps up at b as mentioned above,
we have p := limb0↑b yG(b0) < yG(b). Let r :=
yG(b)
p > 1, and take any K1 > 1
r−1. Then,
for any  > 0, a leader of G with v1


















G − b + 

r > 1,
where the numerator and denominator are the payoﬀs from the bidding b and ˜ b,
respectively, the ﬁrst inequality follows from yG(˜ b) ≤ p, the second inequality follows
from ˜ b ≥ b−, and the last inequality follows from v1
G > b+K1 and from K1 > 1
r−1.
It follows that a bid ˜ b ∈ [b − ,b) can only be made by the group G leader if v1
G ∈
[b − ,b + K1].
Next, set K2 := K1 + 3 for K1 chosen above and assume that the group G leader
has v1
G ∈ [b−,b+K1] — the only possibility that causes the leader to bid in [b−,b).
Suppose that the second-highest rival in the group has v2
G ≤ b−K2. Then, the group
G leader will face no within-group challenge by bidding b − K2 < b − . In fact, for
a suﬃciently small  > 0, a group G leader with v1
G ∈ [b − ,b + K1] strictly prefers
b − K2 to any bid ˜ b ∈ [b − ,b), since
[v1
G −˜ b]yG(˜ b)
[v1
G − (b − K2)]yG(b − K2)
≤
(K1 + 1)yG(˜ b)
(K1 + 2)yG(b − K2)
< 1,
where the numerator and the denominator represent the payoﬀs from bidding ˜ b ∈
[b−,b) and b−K2, respectively, and the ﬁrst inequality holds (for  < 1 say) since
v1
G ∈ [b − ,b + K1] and ˜ b ≥ b − , and the second inequality holds since yG(·) is
21continuous at b. It follows that, for a suﬃciently small  > 0, the group G leader will
never bid in [b − ,b) if v2
G ≤ b − K2.
Combining the two arguments, we conclude that a group G bidder will bid in
[b − ,b) only if v1
G ∈ [b − ,b + K1] and v2
G ∈ (b − K2,b). The probability of this




(F(b + K1) − F(b − K2))
2. Therefore,





































(F(b + K1) − F(b − K2))(K1f(b + K1) + K2f(b − K2))
= 0,
where the inequality follows from (A.3), and the ﬁrst equality follows from the
L’hopital’s rule.
The last string of inequalities implies that it pays the group ˜ G leader to move
down the mass point, which yields a contradiction to the conjectured equilibrium.
Hence, we conclude that yG(·) is continuous for all G ∈ G.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Let bG(vG) be an arbitrary selection from the support of a group G leader’s (pos-
sibly mixed) equilibrium bids when the valuation proﬁle of group G members is vG.





G) refers to the group G leader’s valuation, given proﬁle vG (resp. vG). Let
b = bG(vG) and b = bG(vG), and then we show that b ≤ b; i.e., an arbitrary equi-
librium bidding strategy is nondecreasing. Since b ≥ vm(i) ≥ vm(i), we are done if
b ≤ vm(i). Hence, assume that b > vm(i). This means that, given the proﬁle of vG, the
group G leader could beat all of his within group rivals by bidding b, so his winning
22probability would be simply that of outbidding other group leaders, yG(b). Likewise,
given the proﬁle of vG, the group G leader would face the winning probability of yG(b)
when bidding b. Then, incentive compatibility requires yG(b)[v1
G − b] ≤ yG(b)[v1
G − b]
and we have yG(b)[v1
G − b] ≤ yG(b)[v1





G)(yG(b) − yG(b)) ≥ 0. (A.4)
Suppose, to the contrary, that b > b. Then, since yG(·) is nondecreasing, we must
have yG(b) = yG(b) > 0. But this cannot hold since the group G leader would
strictly prefer to bid b when vG is realized. We therefore conclude that an arbitrary
selection from the equilibrium strategies must be non-decreasing. Because there can
be only countably many jumps in a non-decreasing and bounded correspondence, the
equilibrium bidding strategy of i is almost pure when he is a leader.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Fix an arbitrary partition structure and suppose that there are K groups in that
partition structure. As outlined in the text, we ﬁrst consider a hypothetical game in
which there are only K players, one for each group. In this hypothetical game, player
I ∈ G observes as private information vI = (vi)i∈I, the valuation proﬁle of bidders in







I denotes the rth order statistics of the vector vI, and v2
I = 0 if |I| = 1.
All bidders bid simultaneously, and the good is allocated according to the ﬁrst-price
auction rule. Ties are broken according to our endogenous sharing rule. Formally,
given the proﬁle of bids submitted, b = (b1,··· ,bK), let W(b,v) = argmaxJ{v1
J|J ∈
argmaxH∈G bH} denote the set of highest-valuation bidders (in the hypothetical game)





I − bI) if I ∈ W(b,v)
0 otherwise,
(A.6)
when the players observed v and bid b. Notice that each player only realizes the
highest valuation of his group. If the bidders play a strategy proﬁle β = (βI)I∈G,
then bidder I receives payoﬀ: uI(β) :=
R
UI(β(v);vI)fN(v)dv.
23Given this description of hypothetical game, we turn to existence of the Nash
equilibrium in this game. Reny (1999) provides us with conditions for the existence of
a mixed strategy equilibrium (see Corollary 5.2 of Reny (1999)). First of all, as Reny
(1999) did in the case of multi-unit pay-your-bid auction, we study a restricted version
of this hypothetical game where bid functions are restricted to be nondecreasing.
This latter restriction ensures that the strategy space is compact if endowed with the
pointwise convergence topology, thereby making the set of mixed strategies compact
with the weak
∗ topology. An equilibrium of the restricted hypothetical game will be
shown to be an equilibrium of the hypothetical game later when we show that there
exists a best response satisfying the monotonicity constraint when all other bidders
play the restricted equilibrium strategies.
Given the compactness, better-reply security (as deﬁned in Reny (1999)) is suf-
ﬁcient to establish the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium of the restricted
hypothetical game. We prove that its suﬃcient conditions, reciprocal upper semicon-
tinuity and payoﬀ security, hold for the restricted hypothetical game.14
Step 1: The payoﬀs of the players the restricted hypothetical game satisfy reciprocal
upper semicontinuity in mixed strategies.
Proof. We prove reciprocal upper semicontinuity in the players’ pure strategies,
which is suﬃcient for reciprocal uppersemicontinuity in the mixed strategies. The
former is in turn proven by showing that u(β) =
P
I uI(β) is upper semicontinuous
in β. To this end, we ﬁrst show that U(b;v) :=
P
I UI(b;vI) is upper semicontinuous
in b for every v. For a v, pick an arbitrary b and a sequence b
t = (bt
I)I∈G converging
to b. It suﬃces to show that for any given  > 0, there exists T such that U(b;v)+ ≥
U(b
t;v) for all t ≥ T. Let b = bI and v = v1
I for I ∈ W(b,v). Then, U(b;v) = v − b.
For a suﬃciently large t, we must have (i) W(b
t,v) ⊂ argmaxJ∈G bJ, and that (ii)
14A standard ﬁrst-price auction does not satisfy reciprocal upper semicontinuity, given a random
tie-breaking rule (see Reny (1999), p.1040). Reciprocal upper semicontinuity holds here because of
our endogenous sharing rule, which allocates the good eﬃciently within tying bidders.
24bt


























≤ v − b + 
= U(b;v) + ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (i) since v = maxJ0{v1
J0 | J0 ∈ argmaxJ∈G bJ} ≥
v1
I for any I ∈ W(b
t,v) ⊂ argmaxJ∈G bJ, and the second inequality follows from (ii).
To show the upper semicontinuity of u, consider a sequence β


















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the Fatou’s Lemma (see Ash (1972), p.295, for
instance) and the second inequality from the upper semicontinuity of U.
Step 2: The restricted hypothetical game is payoﬀ secure in mixed strategies.
Proof. Let mI denote the bidder I’s mixed strategy and m = (mI)I∈G its proﬁle
for all players. Note that mI is a mixing over non-decreasing pure strategy bid
functions satisfying (A.5). Then, our game is payoﬀ secure if for every m and every
 > 0, each player i has a strategy mI such that uI(mI,m0
−I) ≥ uI(m) −  for all
m0
−I in some open neighborhood of m−I. This part of the proof follows precisely the
same argument as in Reny (1999). The key step is to observe that, given m−I and
, a player I can achieve a payoﬀ within /2 of his supremum payoﬀ by adopting a
bidding strategy that is strictly increasing in v1
I.15 Since the latter strategy does not
15To see this point, suppose hypothetically that player I wins the auction whenever he makes the
highest bid even if a tie occurs at that bid. Given this presumption, I’s payoﬀ is upper semicon-
tinuous in his bid, so the maximum is well deﬁned and is attained by a bidding function which is
nondecreasing in vi
I. The resulting maximum must constitute an upper bound for I’s payoﬀ (since
he will not always win at a tie in the true game). This payoﬀ can be arbitrarily closely approximated
by a modifying the bid function slightly to raise the bid at a tie and to avoid constant bids.
25put any mass on a single bid, uI(mI,·) is continuous in m−I. Thus, we can take a
neighborhood of m−I where uI(mI,·) is at least uI(m) − .
Given that the two conditions are met, Corollary 5.2 of Reny (1999) implies that
there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium, denoted m∗, whose support consists of
non-decreasing bid functions. Now, we complete the proof by showing that I has a
best response which is non-decreasing, which implies that m∗
I must be a best response
overall.
Step 3: When all other players play their equilibrium strategies of the restricted
hypothetical game, player I has a best response strategy which is non-decreasing.
Proof. As before, let yI(b) denote player I’s probability of winning when bidding
b. By Lemma 2,16 the best response set MI(vI) := argmaxv2
I≤b≤v1
I yI(b)[v1
I − b] is
nonempty. Further, since yI(·) nondecreasing, the objective function satisﬁes the
single crossing property in (b,vI). By Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994),
then one can select a best response function, βI(vI) that is nondecreasing in vI.
This last step implies that m∗ is an equilibrium of the (unrestricted) hypothetical
game. Furthermore, Lemma 3 guarantees that m∗ is almost pure. Hence, there exists
a pure strategy equilibrium β
∗. Given the equilibrium, β
∗, of the hypothetical game,
one can construct the equilibrium strategies for the original game, as described in the
main text.
Proof of Lemma 4. Combining (2) and (3) yields




16While Lemma 2 establishes the continuity for the original game, the same proof applies to the
restricted hypothetical game.


























V G/i xi(vi,vG/i)fG/i(vG/i)dvG/i. The remaining steps are the same
as Myerson (1981) and is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let (xi,ti)n
i=1 and (˜ xi,˜ ti)n
i=1 respectively denote the allocation-
payment pairs arising in the equilibria of auctions E and I. Similarly, and let R and ˜ R
denote the expected revenues, y(v) and ˜ y(v) denote the probabilities of a bidder with
the highest valuation winning the object given v, from auctions E and I, respectively.
By assumption, a set
S := {v ∈ V : ˜ y(v) = y(v) = 1}
has a measure less than one. For almost every v ∈ S,
X
i
J(vi)(xi(v) − ˜ xi(v)) = 0. (A.9)
Let vk denotes kth order statistic of v. Then, for almost every v ∈ V /S,
X
i
J(vi)(xi(v) − ˜ xi(v)) ≥ (J(v
1) − J(v
2))(1 − ˜ y(v)) > 0, (A.10)







J(vi)˜ xi(v) ≤ J(v
1)˜ y(v) + J(v
2)(1 − ˜ y(v)),
and the second inequality holds since J(·) is strictly increasing and ˜ y(·) < 1 in V /S.
27Combining (A.9) and (A.10), we have











J(vi)(xi(v) − ˜ xi(v))f(v) > 0,
since V /S has a strictly positive measure.
We now prove the last statement. Since the net social surplus is seller’s revenue











If the inverse hazard rate
1−F(·)
f(·) is strictly increasing, then the same proof as the one
in revenue comparison yields the stated ranking in terms of the bidders’ expected
surplus.
Proof of Lemma 6. Recall that in equilibrium bidder i receives
πi(vG) = xi(vG)[vi − bi(vG)]. (A.11)
There are two cases.
Case 1: vi ≤ vm(i). Note ﬁrst that πi(vG) = 0 if vi < vm(i), by Lemma 1. We
now prove that πi(vG) = 0 if vi = vm(i). Suppose to the contrary that bidder i earns
strictly positive payoﬀ. Then, his inﬁmum bid must be less than vi but weakly greater
than the inﬁmum bid of bidder m(i). If it is strictly greater, then bidder m(i) can
proﬁtably deviate by outbidding i’s inﬁmum bid. If the inﬁmums coincide, then both
bidders must put mass points there, which yields a contradiction. Hence, bidder i
cannot make strictly positive payoﬀ, which implies that bidder i makes zero payoﬀ
in that case. Since Lemma 1 also implies that xi(vi,vG/i) = 0 for any vi < vm(i), for
any vi ≤ vm(i),




Case 2: vi > vm(i). Since no bidder in G, other than i, bids strictly greater than
vm(i), bidder i beats all other bidders in his group by bidding vm(i) or more, given our
tie-breaking rule. Hence, bidder i will win with probability yG(b) by bidding b ≥ vm(i);
28i.e., zi(b;vG) = yG(b) for any b ≥ vm(i). Furthermore, by Lemma 1, bidder i never
bids below vm(i). Hence, xi(vG) = yG(bi(vG)) since, by Lemma 3, bi(vG) is unique for
almost every vG. Further, we can write:
πi(vG) = max
b≥vm(i)
zi(b;vG)[vi − b] = max
b≥vm(i)
yG(b)[vi − b],
and bi(vG) must be a solution to this constrained maximization problem. Observe
that a function, φ(b,vi) := yG(b)[vi − b], has a derivative, φvi(b,vi) = yG(b), for
all vi ≥ vm(i), and that the derivative is uniformly bounded (by 1). Hence, πi(vG) is
absolutely continuous in vi and can be expressed as an integral of yG(bi(vG)) = xi(vG).




















where the ﬁrst equation follows from Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2000), the
second from φvi(bi(vG),vi) = yG(bi(vG)) = xi(vG), and the third from the result in
Case 1.
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